How Did The “French Algeria” Fanatics Betray The Harkis? Gilles Manceron Explains

The majority of right-wing French politicians and some non-independent historians portray the “Harkis” as victims of the National Liberation Front and Army, but they ignore the major and fundamental responsibility of the French side, an idea that was developed by the famous French anti-colonial historian Gilles Manceron in an article published by the“Mediapart” newspaper.

The article came on the occasion of the celebration of the French “National Day of Tribute to the Harkis”, on September 25, in which the historian blamed the way colonial France dealt with the situation in Algeria in the wake of the outbreak of the liberation revolution, which resorted to immoral and inhuman practices, forcing the Algerians to confront their Algerian brothers to extend the life of its occupation of Algeria and continue to plunder its wealth.

“France is embarrassed by the massive employment of Algerian peasants as assistants during this (liberation war). Recruiting Algerians to wage war against Algerians,” Manceron wrote.
The historian revealed facts that were hidden from many Algerians and the French themselves, which is that General Charles de Gaulle refused to involve the Harkis in the war against the Algerians during the liberation revolution.

“Many witnesses mentioned that General de Gaulle had refused to enlist the Harkis”, says Manceron. “Since France is embarrassed by the fate it reserved, in a colonial logic, for the families of Harkis who took refuge in France at the end of the conflict, a fictional story was invented by the proponents of conservation on French Algeria to the end, about “choosing these men in favour of colonialism”, but the historical reality was different and the words of the Secretary of State to the Minister for the Armed Forces, Patricia Mirallès, in charge of Veterans Affairs and Memory, were not distinguished”.
“After the events of November 1, 1954, the legend of the spontaneous involvement of Harkis in the French army spread. They were presented as motivated by their attachment to France, even through the memory of their participation, or the participation of their parents or grandparents, in the French armies during the two world wars. It is true that, on several occasions, the French authorities invited a large number of Algerians to join the French army…”, the French historian added.

However, Manceron questions the accuracy or validity of this belief by saying; “Many of the initiators of the uprising launched by the Army and the National Liberation Front, such as Mostefa Ben Boulaïd, Krim Belkacem or Ahmed Ben Bella, were former Algerian conscripts in the French army from 1943 to 1945, but they preferred the option of struggling against the occupier”.

Gilles Manceron asserted that the leaders of the French army were guided by a trick, which consisted in inventing the formula of assistants who remained civilians so that it was easy to use the Harkis or abandon them as they wished; “In 1962, they tried to escape with French soldiers to Metropolitan France. The army officers invented for them, from 1954 to 1958, the position of the auxiliaries, exploitable and ‘available’ at will.”

The French military official who bears full responsibility, in this case, is the commander-in-chief of the French armies in Algeria from November 1956 to December 1958 and the future leader of the terrorist organization (OAS), General Raoul Salan, who wrote in his memoirs: “I am determined, outside regular units, on the use of Muslims in their various forms (…) Harkis are associated with our battalions, the Moghaznis who protect the offices of the specialized administrative services (SAS)”, Manceron explained.

“General Salan rejected in July 1957 the idea of independent Algerian units, which he feared would turn into the nucleus of an Algerian army that might turn against the French army. Therefore, he attached units of Harkis and Moghaznis to the regular units of the occupation army commanded by “pureblood French” (FSE), responsible for closely controlling them and disarming them outside of operations”.

To extend the life of the status quo at the time, the historian asserted that the leadership of the French army did everything in its power to hide the independence that was being prepared with the approval of the institutions of the French Republic on the Harkis, and also permanently lied to them about the fact that “France will never leave Algeria” and that it “won’t let them down”, before disarming them in 1962.