Dahou Ould Kablia: “Abbane opposed the revolution's leadership”

In this exclusive interview with Echorouk, Head of the Association of War Veterans’ Armament and Public Communications Ministry (MALG), Dahou Ould Kablia, reveals on the real reasons for the withdrawal of the spiritual father of the Algerian Intelligence Services, Abdelhafid Boussouf, from the political scene of the independent Algeria, and how did the late Houari Boumediene try to strip him of his powers from the armament, public communications and espionage, and join it with the Chief of Staff, which was under his tutelage, how did Boussouf he refuse to waive these powers to Boumediene, and how did he plan to isolate the interim government and other details of the Tripoli conference which cut the friendliness finally between the Chiefs of Staff and the interim government, and dropped the masks through uncovering the growing ambitions and aspirations of some leaders.

There is no doubt that the creation of the Ministry of armament and public communications, which is known as the “MALG”, may have formed a quantum leap in the course of the liberation revolution, but in the other hand and like any human effort, it was surrounded by shortcomings and working conditions. Do you think today, and after more than half a century, that you made errors in the decisions or positions against some of your companions?

-Creation of the MALG within the first Algerian interim government in September 19, 1958, did not come out of nowhere, as it belonged to the powers of its chairman,  Abdelhafid Boussouf, and this ministry shows that the tasks which it was entrusted to fulfill are the same tasks and functions that were exercised within the Coordination and Implementation Committee in August 57, and these tasks were concerning the signal, communications and intelligence services , with its both types of intelligence and counter-espionage. These services were operational and were in the process of all the ministers and at their disposal, in addition to the officials of the Liberation Army inside and outside the country, and all of them were satisfied with the performance and services of this ministry. It was very important and the revolution with all its services and arms greatly benefited from it, but outside the conduct of these services, Boussouf was a political responsible, like his brothers in the National Council of the Algerian Revolution and the Implementation and Coordination Committee. At this level that they were some abuses, political and ideological differences with some activists within the Muslim Brotherhood and the Commission of Implementation and Coordination, and, in particular, and specifically what happened with Abbane Ramdane who was the owner of a special opinion for how to conduct the revolution.

Do you mean that Abbane Ramdane’s opinion did not match with the group’s vision?

-Yes, Abbane Ramdane had a special opinion on how to conduct the revolution, and this perception was totally contrary to the perception of the revolution’s military leaders.

Did Abbane Ramdane have supporters within the Coordination Committee?

-Never, I confirm that the vision of Abbane Ramdane was isolated and he did not have any supporters, and he deliberately dwarfed his companions in the jihad, and I say the man was arrogant and was despising them, to the extent that his repeated presence with comrades needed in many times the intervention of Farhat Abbas.

Were there any solutions in front of the revolution and the “MALG” specifically other then eliminating him?

-In many times when the history noticed conflicts between Abbane and his companions, President of the interim government Farhat Abbas intervened to resolve the differences and to draw attention to the conduct of the revolution that needed consensus, but the man did not believe in the need for unanimity and consensus, and the most dangerous of this is that he was refusing to debate with his colleagues and called them with ugly descriptions. Farhat Abbas wrote in his memoirs that Abbane qualified his comrades as “mules”, and this conflict and variation along the line between Abbane and the military leaders of the revolution turned into a question of existence and survival, and that is, if you want to find an answer to the question of Abbane’s death, and the revolution’s option to liquidate him, all the writings and opinions intersected at one point, which is that the revolution’s only solution was liquidation that was an irreplaceable treatment. Concerning the MALG’s  errors that were found after the killing of Abbane Ramdane, I say that the experience that was gained by this body prevented it from standing in the errors and the results of its work were very positive, and communications which it did was in the service of the revolution, with evidence that it achieved its goals in arming everyone, and extended cells of contacts outside and was in the service of everyone.

Could we say that the MALG was a link between the political and military wings of the revolution?

-Of course, here I assure that the restructuring of this service was a matter and Abdelhafid Boussouf as a person was something else. He was a political man, who is good in playing political roles within the government due to his relationships, and he knew how to dispose deal with the different levels. He met with the upper and the limited levels’ persons, and his opinion was likely, despite his vision that agreed with some people, and the differences with others. His word was decisive and in every meeting of the interim government, he directly started his speech after the opening of the session by Farhat Abbas or after Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, because Boussouf, as a chairman of the MALG, had the basic data on the situation, and he was called in each meeting, to put members of the government in the picture, through providing the political, military and diplomatic situation of the revolution.

Don’t you think that it is an implicit instruction to solve the Ministry of armament?

-Yes, may be as well, because Boussouf stopped all activity, and intentionally gave an instruction to neutralize the MALG elements from any conflict, which he described at the time as the “powers’ conflict “.