Former French Ambassador Fuels Fresh Provocation to Poison Ties with Algeria

As is often the case, former French ambassador to Algeria Xavier Driencourt has chosen a sensitive moment to raise contentious issues and inject divisive subjects into France’s political debate—topics that are routinely seized upon by prominent figures on the French right and far right, whose political fortunes, as is well known, often feed on issues involving Algeria.

In his latest intervention, Driencourt has stirred up a new provocation that could be exploited by figures expected to run in next year’s French presidential election, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Among them are Marine Le Pen, Édouard Philippe and Bruno Retailleau, all of whom have already unveiled their political platforms, a significant part of which focuses on targeting Algerian interests and the country’s diaspora in France.

In an article published Wednesday in the right-leaning Le Journal du Dimanche, Driencourt turned his attention to dual nationals. Rather than addressing dual nationality in general, however, he focused specifically on French-Algerian dual nationals, in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to single out people of Algerian origin and fuel debate around them, amid an increasingly tense political climate between France’s rival political camps.

To avoid appearing, in the eyes of observers, to be targeting Algeria because of his well-documented preoccupation with what has been described as “Algeria-phobia,” the former diplomat sought to anchor his argument in a recent development: the French Foreign Ministry’s publication of recordings of the Evian negotiations between France and Algeria, which ultimately paved the way for Algeria’s independence and established the rights of each side’s nationals in the post-1962 period.

In his provocative contribution, the retired French diplomat sought to draw the attention of presidential hopefuls in his country to what he portrayed as Algeria’s restrictive approach to dual nationals, alleging that Algiers has refused entry to some French-Algerian dual citizens, in contrast to what he described as France’s considerably more accommodating position.

“Recently, we have seen Algeria refuse entry to certain French-Algerian dual nationals,” he wrote. “France, by contrast, appears highly open in recognizing dual nationality. For French-Algerians, this dual status raises both moral and practical questions: Do they feel French first? Or do they prefer to be Algerian, as might be suggested by the presence of so many Algerian flags at football matches?”

Driencourt then drew on documents released by the French Foreign Ministry concerning the Evian Accords. He cited discussions held between the head of the Algerian delegation, Krim Belkacem, and his French counterpart, Louis Joxe, during a three-way negotiating session on May 25, 1961, which, he argues, reveal the French position at the time:

“France considers that minorities—the Europeans in Algeria after independence—who wish to continue living in Algeria should be Algerian citizens. But France also wants them to retain French nationality, while enjoying full rights in Algeria, like other Algerians. Likewise, France does not wish to strip Muslims who wish to remain French, particularly the harkis, of their nationality.”

Driencourt also quoted Krim Belkacem’s response to the position put forward by Louis Joxe, who argued that “dual nationality could apply, as opposed to the French, to Algerian Muslims,” adding that Algeria rejected such an arrangement, whereas France accepted it, along with its legal consequences.

Driencourt then asked: “Will citizens be able to exercise their rights in Algeria and France simultaneously?”

Drawing on the French Foreign Ministry document, he answered: “For France, French citizens’ rights would be exercised in France, and Algerian citizens’ rights in Algeria. As for the French nationality granted to Algerian Muslims with ties to France, it would mean that they could not be treated as foreigners in France; French nationality would, in effect, serve as a nationality of attachment.”

Krim Belkacem’s response, however, was that “the French in Algeria would be encouraged to link their fate to the Algerian nation. Algeria would be a welcoming homeland for those who chose Algerian nationality. The others—that is, those who did not wish to integrate into independent Algeria—would remain French, but would have to live in Algeria as foreigners.

Whatever claims the former French ambassador to Algeria is seeking to promote, his intervention reflects his long standing role as an influential commentator on the French right and far right on matters concerning relations with Algeria. His latest move appears aimed at opening yet another front of controversy between the two countries, this time over dual nationals—much as he previously sought to do with the 1968 Franco-Algerian agreement.

That agreement has since risen to the top of the agenda of right-wing presidential hopefuls, who have incorporated it into their platforms ahead of the next French presidential election. The dual-nationality issue, meanwhile, is likely to become another major point of contention in the political sparring between the candidates in the days ahead.