Late Chadli Bendjedid: “FIS party should have been empowered in 1991 as it was elected by the people”

In this report, Echorouk delves into the striking emergence on the Algerian political scene in the late eighties of the now dissolved FIS party and the bitter confrontations with the then authorities after the forced cancellation of the returns of the 1991 parliamentary elections won by the FIS and how President Chadli Bendjedid had to face up to that dire situation until his resignation in 1992.

In early 2002, late Chadli Bendjedid gave an interview to a Japanese daily in which he explained that he had wanted to accept the result of the 1991 legislative elections and work with the winning Islamist FIS party as the latter was chosen democratically through the ballot box by the people. He believed that the constitution gave him the power to prevent the FIS taking over all government institutions, but he failed to persuade the army chiefs, as he put it.

Chadli Bendjedid, who served as Algeria’s third president since independence, died on October 6. He was accredited by the international media and pro-democracy activists as the first Arab leader to have introduced profound political reforms in the late 1980s. Sensing the change in the international system resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Bendjedid challenged the conservative ruling establishment and called for the first multiparty elections in the modern history of Algeria.

His critics in Algeria and France, in particular, accused him however of allowing the victory of the Islamists in the 1991 general elections. Indeed, this view views is in fact too simplistic. The situation in Algeria was then much more complicated.

Since it wrenched a hard-won independence from France in July 1962, Algeria adopted a socialist path of development with the National Liberation Front (FLN) holding power in a one-party ruling system. Like most oil producers, Algeria enjoyed the boom of the oil bonanza throughout the 1970s.

But, On October 5, 1988, all conditions seemed ripe for a popular uprising. Algerians took to the streets, protesting against the untoward adjustment policies of the IMF which led to an increase in food prices. Riot police and army troops confronted the crowds killing hundreds of demonstrators. Under popular pressure, Bendjedid responded by adopting more liberal policies.

In February 1989, a constitution was drawn up authorizing the establishment of political parties and a free press at Bendjedid’s initiative. Municipal and parliamentary elections were scheduled. Shortly after, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was established and in June 1990 it achieved its first victory in municipal elections, winning more than half of Algeria’s municipalities including the capital, Algiers.

A second round of violence convinced the authorities to set a date for parliamentary elections: December 26, 1991. The violence was precipitated by a controversial electoral law that was designed to pre-empt a feared landslide victory by FIS. In the general election, the municipal scenario was repeated and out of 430 seats in parliament, FIS won 188 with the prospect of taking two thirds in the second round scheduled for January 16, 1992.

Things seemed to have gone wrong. The ruling establishment had agreed to free elections because it was believed that providing some room for a loyal opposition to challenge the government would subdue domestic opposition, ease outside criticism, but not undermine the state.

Accordingly, the powers that be could not accept the new realities established by the December elections. The president, however, was ready to compromise, but neither FIS nor the ruling conservative establishment was willing to do so.

On January 11, 1992, the president was forced to resign, the elections were cancelled, and, in March 1992, the FIS party was officially dissolved.

Given the events of the Arab Spring and the change which have taken place in several Arab countries over the past two years, Bendjedid’s democratic reforms may seem to have taken place too early. Clearly, the Arab world, including Algeria, was not ripe enough for democratic transition at the time as it might have become today. Late Chadli Bendjedid’s only fault would be then that he did the right thing in the wrong time.